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Abstract
Transnational tobacco, alcohol and ultra-processed food corporations use the international trade
regime to prevent policy action on non-communicable diseases (NCDs); i.e. to promote policy
‘non-decisions’. Understanding policy non-decisions can be assisted by identifying power operat-
ing in relevant decision-making spaces, but trade and health research rarely explicitly engages
with theories of power. This realist review aimed to synthesize evidence of different forms and
mechanisms of power active in trade and health decision-making spaces to understand better why
NCD policy non-decisions persist and the implications for future transformative action. We itera-
tively developed power-based theories explaining how transnational health-harmful commodity
corporations (THCCs) utilize the international trade regime to encourage NCD policy non-decisions.
To support theory development, we also developed a conceptual framework for analysing power
in public health policymaking. We searched six databases and relevant grey literature and
extracted, synthesized and mapped the evidence against the proposed theories. One hundred
and four studies were included. Findings were presented for three key forms of power. Evidence
indicates THCCs attempt to exercise instrumental power by extensive lobbying often via privileged
access to trade and health decision-making spaces. When their legitimacy declines, THCCs have
attempted to shift decision-making to more favourable international trade legal venues. THCCs
benefit from structural power through the institutionalization of their involvement in health and
trade agenda-setting processes. In terms of discursive power, THCCs effectively frame trade and
health issues in ways that echo and amplify dominant neoliberal ideas. These processes may fur-
ther entrench the individualization of NCDs, restrict conceivable policy solutions and perpetuate
policymaking norms that privilege economic/trade interests over health. This review identifies
different forms and mechanisms of power active in trade and health policy spaces that enable
THCCs to prevent progressive action on NCDs. It also points to potential strategies for challenging
these power dynamics and relations.
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Introduction
Understanding how corporations constrain public health policy ac-
tion, or in other words, promote policy ‘non-decision-making’, has
been a growing concern for nearly half a century. Over the past few
decades, public health researchers have exposed multiple strategies
used by transnational health-harmful commodity corporations
(THCCs) to prevent regulation of health-harmful commodities
(Jiang and Ling, 2013; Ulucanlar et al., 2014; Gilmore et al., 2015;
Balwicki et al., 2016; Bertscher et al., 2018; Mccambridge et al.,
2018; Hawkins et al., 2019). One increasingly relevant tactical area
relates to international trade. Scholars have focused on analysing
corporate use of trade rules and disputes, finding that by shaping
trade rules, THCCs can limit future domestic public health policy
space for regulating health-harmful commodities (Labonte et al.,
2011; Baker et al., 2014) and by threatening or triggering a trade
dispute it may be possible to generate regulatory chill across mul-
tiple countries (Hawkins et al., 2019). These analyses have led to
calls by public health advocates for transparency and accountability
in trade agreement processes with greater participation of health
actors; and ensured protection of public health policy space in trade
agreements (McNeill et al., 2017b). But little in practice has been
achieved to transform patterns of exclusion of public health actors
and concerns in trade policy development (Townsend et al., 2020a).
We argue this may be in part due to a failure to expose and adopt
strategies that challenge the underlying power dynamics and rela-
tions at the nexus of trade and health.
Understanding the nature and mechanisms of power is increas-
ingly recognized as critical to understanding contemporary public
health policy processes and outcomes (Hansen et al., 2013;
Shiffman, 2014; Forman, 2015; Gómez, 2016; Gore and Parker,
2019), including non-decisions. Yet trade and health policy analysis
has rarely engaged directly with theories of power. Only limited
more recent empirical research has adopted a politically informed
approach that examines certain aspects of power operating at the
nexus of trade and health policy (Battams and Townsend, 2018;
Lencucha et al., 2018; Thow et al., 2018). Research on framing in
trade policy has described how a dominant neoliberal discourse
privileges export interests over health (Townsend et al., 2020b),
including transnational ultra-processed food and alcohol exporters
(Baker et al., 2019). Studies have also explored strategies used by
public health advocates to claim authority and legitimacy in trade
negotiations (Townsend et al., 2019). Other analyses have high-
lighted power asymmetries in access to decision-making spaces be-
tween business and public health actors (Battams and Townsend,
2018).
We suggest a more explicit and rigorous integration of theories
of power in trade and health policy analyses could expand our
understanding of how and why non-communicable disease (NCD)
policy non-decisions persist as well as why, so far, relatively limited
progress has been made towards increasing attention to NCD risk
factors in trade policy. By making visible the different forms, mecha-
nisms and spaces of power at the nexus of trade and health, it
becomes possible to identify and evaluate strategies that may gener-
ate the necessary changes in power relations between health, trade
and corporate actors to drive transformative policy change
(Gaventa, 2006).
This realist review attempts to fill this gap in the literature.
Building on established theories of power, we develop a conceptual
framework for analysing the interrelationship between different
forms, mechanisms and spaces of power in health policymaking. We
then map existing evidence against theories grounded in the frame-
work with the aim of better understanding how the power relations
between trade, health and corporate actors have emerged and as
such, why NCD policy non-decisions persist. By exposing power in
this way, it also becomes possible to start identifying strategies to ef-
fectively challenge it. While evidence is included from countries
across all income groups, we focus, where possible, on low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) since they have become the focus
for expansion by many THCCs ( Lawrence, 2011; Savell et al.,
2015; Walls et al., 2020) but generally have limited capacity—finan-
cial, institutional, technical and strategic—to resist attempts by
THCCs’ to influence health policy processes (Walls et al., 2015).
Methods
The realist review methodology is based on identifying, interpreting
and synthesizing a wide range of evidence to develop and refine ex-
planatory theories about how and why a complex situation results
in specific outcomes in certain contexts (Punton et al., 2016). Thus,
it is useful for expanding trade and health policy analysis beyond a
description of problematic trade rules, towards gaining insights into
the political economy of trade and health policy.
The review was undertaken according to an adapted protocol
based broadly on Pawson’s five iterative stages: identifying and
articulating the explanatory theories; searching for and appraising
the evidence; extracting the data; synthesizing the evidence; and
drawing conclusions (Pawson et al., 2004). However, during stage
one, we integrated an additional step of conceptual framework de-
velopment. Here, based on synthesis of existing substantive theory
relating to health policy processes, we developed a conceptual
framework for analysing health policy decisions and non-decisions.
The substantive theories embedded within the framework were used
to facilitate explanatory theory development and ensure theory ro-
bustness. The reporting of this review adheres to RAMSES publica-
tion standards (Wong et al., 2013).
KEY MESSAGES
• The international trade regime provides transnational health-harmful commodity corporations with opportunities to use and benefit
from instrumental, structural and discursive power in ways that likely contribute to non-communicable disease (NCD) prevention
policy non-decisions in both national and international policymaking spaces—and particularly so under a dominant neoliberal
paradigm.
• Recognizing power in all its forms across different political spaces and levels is essential for enabling public health actors to identify
and evaluate effective strategies for improving trade and health policy coherence.
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Initial scope of the literature and explanatory theory
development
Initial explanatory theories were developed through a rapid scoping
of relevant trade and health policy literature. This was conducted
using concept searches, e.g. ‘regulatory/policy chill’, ‘policy space’
or ‘trade and health policymaking’ in Scopus and Google Scholar,
citation tracking and snowballing. Grey literature was also searched,
and key studies suggested by other trade and health researchers
known to the authors were sourced. Relevant explanatory informa-
tion from different sources was interpreted, synthesized and mapped
against the conceptual framework in an iterative process of prelim-
inary theory development.
Development of conceptual framework for analysing
power in public health policymaking
Existing conceptual frameworks and theories useful for understand-
ing the underlying causal mechanisms of contemporary health policy
processes that were judged to be grounded, at least to some extent,
in political economy theory, or included concepts of power, were
identified through purposive searching (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962;
Easton, 1965; Lukes, 1974; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Walt
and Gilson, 1994; John, 1998; Gaventa, 2006; Fuchs and Lederer,
2007; Shiffman and Smith, 2007; Howlett et al., 2009; Rushton and
Williams, 2012; Madureira Lima and Galea, 2018). In a process
running parallel to explanatory theory building, we synthesized rele-
vant elements from several of these frameworks and theories in an
iterative process to develop a conceptual framework for analysing
power in contemporary public health policymaking (Figure 1). The
new conceptual framework builds on the three key forms of power
outlined in Fuchs and Lederer’s framework with a strong focus on
Lukes’ Three Dimensions of Power (Lukes, 1974). Each form of
power is expressed via various mechanisms adapted from the ‘Three
Is’ framework (Hall, 1997; Lavis et al., 2002; Gauvin, 2014; Shearer
et al., 2016) and with examples drawn from Madureira Lima and
Galea’s framework of corporate practices and health. Mechanisms
are active in different spaces and at different levels as described in
Gaventa’s Power Cube (Gaventa, 2006). Outcomes of power can be
either policy decisions to act or non-decisions expressed as inaction.
Specifically, the new conceptual framework was designed for analy-
sing why and how certain public health issues and solutions are rec-
ognized and lead to meaningful policy action while others are either
never recognized, suffocated before they make it onto the political
agenda or are minimized or re-interpreted in the decision-making
stage such that transformative policy action rarely occurs. The pur-
pose of this was to further develop relevant substantive theory in
which our explanatory theories could be grounded. We then
mapped existing evidence found in the formal literature search
against these theories derived from the framework.
Although the forms, mechanisms, dimensions and outcomes of
power are diagrammatically presented in Figure 1 as separate ele-
ments, there is interdependence with dynamic feedback both within
and between elements. Furthermore, multiple forms of power usual-
ly influence any given policy process.
Instrumental power is similar to Lukes’ first dimension of power
and is focused on the direct influence different actors have over for-
mal political decisions. Actor A is considered to have power over
actor B if actor A can persuade actor B to do something she/he
would not otherwise do (Lukes, 1974). For example, corporations
use political financing to build relationships with politicians and
undertake extensive lobbying to directly influence political decision-
makers.
Structural power is generally hidden and includes setting the pol-
itical agenda (Lukes, 1974; Gaventa, 2006). This is achieved by
powerful actors reinforcing and taking advantage of social and pol-
itical values, economic structures and institutional practices that
limit the issues for consideration, who is included in decision-
making spaces, and the scope of potential solutions (Bachrach and
Baratz, 1962; Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). As a consequence, certain
actors are prevented from raising to the political agenda issues that
may be detrimental to more powerful actors who seek to defend the
status quo (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). For example, Tobacco control
does not make it onto the political agenda in certain tobacco-
producing countries. The second aspect of structural power refers to
rule-setting power whereby underlying economic and institutional
structures and processes place certain actors in the position of being
able to make rules themselves (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). For ex-
ample, public–private partnerships enable corporations to influence
the design, implementation and enforcement of certain rules, includ-
ing via self-regulation schemes (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007).
Discursive power is the most insidious form of power and shapes
the ideational and psychological boundaries of participation with
significant problems and potential solutions not only kept from the
Figure 1 Conceptual framework for analysing power in public health policymaking.
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decision-making table, but also outside the minds of actors involved,
including those directly affected by the problem (Gaventa, 2006).
Controlling how individuals perceive the world, shape their inter-
pretation and understanding of important issues and preferred solu-
tions (Lukes, 1974; Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). As such, less
powerful actors are prevented from elevating significant policy
issues and/or potential solutions in their own real interest because
they are inconceivable, considered unacceptable or because they ac-
cept the status quo as natural and unchangeable or are socialized
into believing an alternative is more beneficial (Lukes, 1974;
Gaventa, 2006).
Groups of individual actors perceived as legitimate may stra-
tegically exercise discursive power (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007), e.g.
the alcohol industry widely communicates an individual-level fram-
ing and narratives of alcohol-related harm, effectively excluding
supply-side solutions as conceivable options. However, discursive
power also emerges at the system level as a function of dominant
ideas and institutional arrangements/practices that over time gener-
ate powerful cognitive and behavioural norms.
Each form of power may be exercised by actors or emerge from
the system via eight different but interdependent mechanisms. These
are ideologies (e.g. the neoliberal political ‘project’); values (e.g. in-
dividual freedom and choice); knowledge and evidence (e.g. ‘science
to specification’, funding education and manufacturing doubt); per-
ception and preference-shaping (e.g. issue framing and narratives
communicated through corporate foundations, front groups, think
tanks and public relations companies, opinion leaders, media cap-
ture and marketing and advertising); organizational structures (e.g.
corporate participation in government agencies, committees and
commissions and in policy development); relationships (e.g. corpor-
ate lobbying, revolving doors and political donations); rules (e.g.
trade agreements and investment treaties); and norms (e.g. priori-
tization of economic over health imperatives in political decision-
making).
Dimensions of power include the different levels—international,
national or sub-national where power resides or is contested.
Dimensions of power also include different spaces, defined here as
formal or informal opportunities where actors can ‘potentially affect
policies, discourses, decisions and relationships’ relevant to their
interests (Gaventa, 2006). Spaces may be closed, open, invited or
claimed and are interdependent, changing over time as actors and
ideas struggle for legitimacy (Gaventa, 2006). The drivers of ill-
health are increasingly recognized to arise from supra-national pol-
icy decisions beyond the control of national governments (Ottersen
et al., 2014). At the same time, power over such decisions can reside
in spaces closed to health actors, both formal spaces e.g. the World
Trade Organization (WTO) forums, and informal spaces, e.g. pri-
vate meetings between industry and government.
The outcome of power may be a policy decision defined here
simply as policy action. This may be voluntarily or involuntary and
optimal or suboptimal, e.g. adopting a 10% tax on sugar-sweetened
beverages rather than a preferred 20% tax evidenced to have a more
optimal impact on consumption. The alternative outcome is a policy
non-decision which is defined in this work as a voluntary decision
not to act (e.g. deliberate prioritization of economic over health
objectives); an involuntary failure to act (e.g. health actors do not
pursue a desired measure to avoid a trade dispute); or inaction due
to a psychological boundary issue (e.g. supply-side issues are never
considered by policy actors since they so strongly contravene domin-
ant perceptions of NCDs as an individual risk and responsibility
issue).
Finally, certain contexts—political, economic, socio-cultural or
situational—can inhibit or activate different mechanisms of power
generating different outcomes. For example, LMICs very often have
limited capacities—human, financial, organizational, technical and
strategic—to exercise instrumental power in relation to negotiating
trade rules or agreements in such a way that balances both their eco-
nomic and health objectives. Lobbying as a form of instrumental
power may be constrained where there are clear processes for man-
aging conflicts of interest or restrictions on lobbying in governance
spaces. The rule-setting (structural) power of THCCs may be
enabled in contexts where there is a strong preference for market-led
approaches to governance. Discourses that promote the primacy of
markets and involvement of private sector in governance may be
resisted in country contexts with strong human rights norms.
Searching and appraising the evidence
Main search
A systematic search of the literature was undertaken with the aim of
identifying the most relevant evidence to support or dispute the ini-
tial set of explanatory theories. The final search strategy included
combinations of search and indexed terms for the concepts of inter-
national trade and investment liberalization, regulatory chill, policy
process, relevant transnational corporations and three trade-
sensitive public health policy areas: nutrition, tobacco control and
alcohol regulation (Supplementary Text SI). These concepts were
developed and refined iteratively with repeated testing in
MEDLINE, review of search results, development/refinement of ex-
planatory theories and, in turn, further concept development. The
search terms were then developed through repeated testing in six
databases: MEDLINE, Global Health, Econlit, SCOPUS, Web of
Science and PubMed in order to balance reasonable sensitivity and
specificity (given project time constraints) and the realist approach
of searching broadly.
All six database searches were conducted in January 2020 and
limited to English language publications between 1 January 2008
and 15 January 2020. It was considered reasonable to limit the
search from 2008 onwards given that engagement with and under-
standing of trade issues by health academics was relatively limited
prior to this (Smith et al., 2009). Bibliography searching was con-
ducted on studies particularly relevant for theory development. The
final reference list was reviewed to ensure all relevant papers identi-
fied in the initial scoping review were included.
We also conducted searches for relevant grey literature in
Google and Google Scholar and online repositories of the World
Health Organization (WHO), WTO, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development and International Institute of Sustainable
Development. All articles were downloaded to an Endnote database
and duplicates removed.
Inclusion criteria
Pawson (2006) suggests that inclusion be based on relevance to pro-
gramme theories and explanatory potential, whether the source ma-
terial contains discernible ‘nuggets’ of evidence, and evidence of
trustworthiness, or, in other words, ‘whether it is good and relevant
enough’. Consistent with Pawson’s approach, no study was
excluded based on a single aspect of quality. The criteria applied are
outlined in Table 1.
Selection and appraisal of documents
Electronic searches yielded 1585 results. An additional 51 items
were identified through bibliography searches, citation tracking and
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searches of Google/Google Scholar and institutional websites. After
duplicates were removed, 991 unique items remained. Given the
realist approach and the limited literature, an intentionally inclusive
approach was taken throughout the selection process.
In a preliminary screening, articles were selected based on the
test for inclusion derived from realist principles (Table 1), as judged
by the titles and abstracts. Commentaries (unless based on empirical
evidence or providing key anecdotal evidence), editorials, opinion
pieces, conference abstracts and data-free models/frameworks were
excluded. After a scoping of included literature, the review scope
was narrowed—to ensure sufficiently in-depth analysis could be
undertaken—to include just the impact of trade issues (excluding in-
vestment) on the three policy areas. With this limitation applied, the
first reviewer’s screen resulted in 174 texts being retained for full-
text review. A second reviewer screened 10% of all references
resulting in 2% differences in opinion regarding evidential relevance
or study quality. Given discrepancies were below 10%, after resolv-
ing these differences via discussion, the remaining publications were
single-screened.
Full texts were retrieved for 170 of the 174 articles included after
initial screening with four articles not retrievable. The 170 full texts
were again assessed for relevance based on the test for inclusion.
Full-text review resulted in exclusion of a further 66 articles bringing
the final number of relevant articles to 104 (Figure 2). Ten per cent
of the full texts were again reviewed by the second reviewer resulting
in 100% inter-reviewer agreement. The remaining texts were
assessed for inclusion by the first reviewer only.
A screening tool (Supplementary Text SII and SIIb) was used to
document the rationale for final inclusion/exclusion in the realist
synthesis. This included a set of queries regarding study relevance
Table 1 Inclusion criteria
Include the study if:
• It contains ‘nuggets’ of evidence that provide insight into the review questions, such that even where the aims of the study diverge from the main
focus of this review, if a ‘nugget’ of evidence relevant to the review questions is provided, this article is included.
AND
• It is assessed to go beyond a superficial description or commentary, i.e. is a competent attempt at research, enquiry, investigation or study (Curnock
et al., 2012).This can include qualitative studies using key informant interviews and policy document reviews, surveys, expert legal analyses, case
studies, reviews of primary research (if the method was stated) or descriptive models/frameworks (if based on primary data).
Exclude the study if:
• The focus is on agricultural policy, food safety, genetically modified foods and labelling or biotechnology.
• It analyses trade and investment agreements, WTO disputes but do not also explicitly analyse the impacts (or potential impacts) on health policy
processes (prospectively or retrospectively) OR policy space
• It examines how trade liberalization impacted on health determinants and outcomes but not on health policy processes.
• Books and book chapters.
Figure 2 Screening flow diagram.
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and reliability based on the test for inclusion adapted from a similar
set of constructs (Williams et al., 2016). The final 104 articles
included in the synthesis were imported into NVivo and stored as in-
dividual ‘sources’. Given the diversity of included articles in terms of
discipline and methods, it was not possible to apply a single recog-
nized quality appraisal assessment tool to report on overall quality
of the studies included in the review. Instead, the realist approach
was taken by which each entire study was not assessed for quality
but rather each nugget of relevant evidence identified within a pri-
mary study was judged on its reliability and relevance to theory
development.
Data extraction, analysis and synthesis
processes
Within NVivo, ‘nodes’ were generated for each preliminary explana-
tory theory. The first reviewer extracted data from each included
article that was considered relevant and useful to theory develop-
ment, including data that supported or challenged each explanatory
mechanism and the associated outcomes as well as relevant context-
ual factors. As additional useful theories were identified new nodes
were generated and relevant data extracted. In addition, information
on study characteristics (e.g. type of study, methodological ap-
proach, health issues covered) was recorded on the screening tool.
NVivo was used not only to improve robustness of data analysis but
also to improve transparency by providing an audit of the data ana-
lysis process. The data extracted under each node were imported
into a Word document for analysis. They were analysed and synthe-
sized using a realist approach that was both deductive and inductive.
The findings are presented in a narrative synthesis.
Results
The 104 studies included in the review were from a variety of fields
including public health, international law and political science.
Accordingly, studies varied in design and methods including pro-
spective analyses of trade and investment agreement texts, analyses
of WTO committee meeting minutes and WTO disputes; surveys
and key informant interviews; and critical analyses of industry and
policy documents. Given that our review question requires investiga-
tion of policy decisions but particularly non-decisions and the role
of power in these outcomes, we identified very few quantitative
analyses for inclusion. Furthermore, our enquiry is inherently multi-
disciplinary in nature with legal, political and other social science re-
search providing valuable insights. For these reasons, we opted to in-
clude analyses based on expert opinion and deductive reasoning, not
only empirical research. In most studies, formal power analysis was
lacking or limited and understanding contextual elements was gen-
erally not included as a primary research objective and typically
only discussed superficially.
The analysis presents the evidence for each explanatory theory/
mechanism under theory areas based on the three power types out-
lined in the conceptual framework (Figure 1).
Instrumental power
Economic liberalization has facilitated increases in efficiency, profit-
ability and global reach of THCCs (Friel et al., 2013, 2015; Appau
et al., 2017). As regulation increases and risk commodity consump-
tion declines in High income countries (HICs), THCCs have
responded by focusing on developing markets in LMICs (WHO,
2018). As such, THCCs are increasingly interested in influencing
domestic risk commodity regulatory environments in LMICs, as
well as international rule-setting bodies including the WTO and
WHO. As TRCCs grow in size and profitability (Moodie et al.,
2013), their capacity to fund ongoing intensive multi-level lobbying
strategies gives them a powerful advantage over public health and
civil society actors (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). Lobbying activities
occur in both open and increasingly closed spaces as THCCs are
granted privileged access to political decision-makers due to con-
cerns about economic growth and the increasing complexity of pol-
icy issues (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). International trade rules
provide a valuable legal instrument for THCCs to influence health
policy decisions. As a result of these processes, it can be suggested
that less powerful health policy actors may voluntarily decide not to
act or be forced to make involuntary non-decisions relating to risk
commodity regulations.
A number of studies provided evidence of THCC lobbying across
multiple trade and health political fora. For example, during
China’s WTO accession negotiations British American Tobacco
(BAT) intensively lobbied the UK, EU and US officials to petition for
among other things, lower tariffs on tobacco products and no
restrictions on tobacco advertising (Holden et al., 2010). The alco-
hol industry has similarly lobbied for favourable trade arrangements
(Zeigler, 2009). More recently, during the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPPA) negotiations ultra-processed food and beverage
corporations undertook extensive lobbying advocating for increased
market access, greater regulatory harmonization and investment
protections, each with possible implications for nutrition policy
space (Friel et al., 2016). THCC’s also use various lobbying tactics
to influence the development of international health governance
instruments. For example, during negotiations for the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) BAT lobbied the WTO to
ensure tobacco was not excluded from multilateral trade agreements
(Mamudu et al., 2011).
Decision-makers can be motivated to grant certain business
actors privileged access to decision-making spaces given the com-
plexity of trade rules and concerns for economic growth. During
both the TPPA and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
agreement (TTIP) negotiations e.g. tobacco companies met privately
with US and European Commission (EC) trade officials to discuss
the proposed agreements (Crosbie and Glantz, 2014). A Canadian
case-study evidenced a close relationship between industry and the
trade ministry with one interviewee indicating that the trade minis-
try was ‘effectively an internal lobby for business’ (Van Harten and
Scott, 2016b). A New Zealand study found that the food and bever-
age industry had a ‘high relative capacity to directly access decision-
makers’ in relation to obesity and diabetes policy, as compared to
other actor groups (de Bruin et al., 2018).
However, as their legitimacy declines, THCC’s access to certain
decision-making spaces can diminish (Hawkins et al., 2019). This
may prompt THCCs to engage in ‘venue shifting’—a strategy to
claim alternative spaces of influence through shifting decision-
making power to fora, in this case legal, including international
trade venues, where their interests may be prioritized (Eckhardt
et al., 2016; Hawkins et al., 2019). Various studies provide insight
into the potential for international trade rules to be used by THCCs
and their patron states to directly obstruct, delay or divert resources
from progressive public health policymaking. These include WTO
rules but also ‘WTO-plus’ rules, deeper than minimum WTO obliga-
tions (Bacchetta et al., 2011; Baldwin, 2011; WTO, 2013) and
‘WTO-extra’ rules that extend further behind national borders to re-
duce what are considered to be non-tariff barriers to trade (Baldwin,
2011). While a detailed review of this literature is included in
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Supplementary Text SIII, Table 2 summarizes the key mechanisms
by which trade rules may provide opportunities for THCCs to influ-
ence public health policy decisions as previously described by Kelsey
(Kelsey, 2013).
While THCCs cannot themselves bring claims against govern-
ments at WTO for violating international trade obligations, there is
evidence that corporations use international trade-related legal
threats in an attempt to force involuntary public health policy non-
decisions and prevent policy transfer regionally or globally, especial-
ly for tobacco control (Freeman et al., 2008). For example, in the
1990s tobacco companies claimed Thailand’s proposed cigarette
ingredients disclosure legislation violated the TRIPS Agreement and
Canada and Australia’s proposed plain packaging violated intellec-
tual property rights under TRIPs and NAFTA (Crosbie and Glantz,
2014). More recently, at least four African countries have received
warnings from the tobacco industry that their proposed tobacco
laws violate international trade and investment agreements
(Hawkins and Holden, 2016). At the supra-national level, tobacco
companies commissioned a number of legal analyses supporting
their argument that the FCTC created both jurisdictional and sub-
stantive conflicts with international trade agreements (Weishaar
et al., 2012).
When necessary, the alcohol industry is also adopting similar
strategies. For example, the alcohol industry threatened a WTO dis-
pute against Thailand if it adopted a proposed ban on alcohol adver-
tising (Casswell and Thamarangsi, 2009) and argued that the
Scottish government’s legislation on minimum unit pricing of alco-
hol is a technical barrier to trade (Weiss, 2015). In Canada’s Yukon
Territory, the alcohol industry prevented adoption of specific health
warning labels from bottles and cans by arguing the regulation
would be in violation of a range of laws including international
trade law (O’Brien et al., 2018).
Trade-related legal threats may be effective tools for THCCs to
drive involuntary non-decisions by governments due to the complex-
ity of establishing an adequate defence in a WTO dispute and the
vagueness of WTO rules (Stumberg, 2013). First, a defending gov-
ernment must convince the dispute panel that their measure passes a
‘necessity test’. This involves a complex multi-step process of prov-
ing that the measure is necessary to protect public health in relation
to its effect on trade; effective in achieving a specific health object-
ive; is no more trade restrictive than necessary; and there is no less
trade-restrictive alternative measure available (Stumberg, 2013;
Thow et al., 2017a). The level of justification required is reduced if
the measure is based on a relevant international standard (Thow
et al., 2017a). WTO dispute panels are required to weigh and bal-
ance these factors which can make the likely outcome of a dispute
difficult to predict (Stumberg, 2013).
Passing the necessity test is particularly challenging and complex
due to significant uncertainty regarding evidential requirements to
prove the necessity of a health measure. For example, the SPS
Agreement states a measure must be ‘based on’ scientific principles,
evidence and risk assessment which leaves some scope for interpret-
ation. Furthermore, it may not be possible for a country to produce
indisputable scientific evidence of effectiveness (Stumberg, 2013),
particularly for a novel or pre-emptive policy attempting to mitigate
a developing threat. For example, a number of countries opposing
Brazil and Canada’s ban on tobacco additives and Ireland’s pro-
posed plain packaging asserted there was no scientific evidence that
these novel measures would effectively reduce smoking (Lencucha
et al., 2016). More recent discussions about Thailand’s proposed al-
cohol health warning labelling indicate WTO may accept health
measures without indisputable evidence of effectiveness but which
are grounded in existing science (O’Brien and Mitchell, 2018).
However, there is concern that newer agreements like the TPPA will
set a higher bar for evidential requirements to justify a health meas-
ure (Kelsey, 2013; Labonté et al., 2016). Concurrently, it is a recog-
nized strategy of THCCs to generate their own opposing evidence
that can confound a dispute panel’s assessment (Stumberg, 2013).
Vagueness in trade agreement text has resulted in variable inter-
pretations and rulings by dispute panels creating uncertainty when
governments evaluate the risk of future potential WTO disputes in
light of a trade-related legal threat (Stumberg, 2013). For example,
‘necessity’ was interpreted narrowly in the 1990 case over
Thailand’s ban on tobacco imports where it was ruled insufficient jus-
tification was provided for the ban as part of a comprehensive tobacco
policy. Thailand was forced to reverse the ban and reduce tobacco ex-
cise duties (Stumberg, 2013). Similarly, in the 1997 US–Gasoline case,
it was ruled that the overall impact of the whole clean air policy could
not justify individual provisions within it (Stumberg, 2013). In 2011,
Samoa reversed a ban on a fatty meat cut after WTO members ‘ques-
tioned the prohibition of a single food item in order to address the
[. . .] complex problem of obesity’ (Thow et al., 2017b; World Trade
Organization, 2011). In the 2007 Brazil–Tyres case, however, neces-
sity was interpreted progressively and the cumulative contribution of
individual measures within a comprehensive approach was accepted
(Stumberg, 2013). While there has arguably been a shift towards more
progressive interpretations of necessity by WTO panels (Drope and
Lencucha, 2014), overall interpretation variability and a lack of case
law for alcohol or food policy may still create significant uncertainty
of outcome for governments.
If the significant hurdle of proving necessity is passed, a govern-
ment must establish that their proposed measure is not unjustifiably
discriminatory between countries (Stumberg, 2013; Lester, 2015).
Satisfying this requirement, however, by applying a measure in a
non-discriminatory manner may often not be politically feasible
since most public health policy is the result of stakeholder bargain-
ing (von Tigerstrom, 2013, Gruszczynski, 2013). Furthermore, there
is no consistent approach regarding what constitutes ‘like’ products
when assessing for discrimination between countries (Weiss, 2015).
While some anecdotal evidence exists, empirical evidence that
THCCs can effectively promote non-decisions by health depart-
ments by generating real or perceived risk of a WTO dispute is, so
far, limited. A 2014 Canadian case study found that particularly se-
nior health and safety regulators were concerned with avoiding
WTO disputes, although it was not generally reported as a key con-
cern (Côté, 2014). The study also reported that trade disputes were
Table 2 Key mechanism by which trade rules may limit public
health policy space and provide opportunities for TRCCs and their
patron states to influence public health policymaking (Kelsey,
2013)
• Substantive rules [e.g. in Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) chapters]
• Criteria applied to decision-making and choosing between policy
options e.g. fulfilling requirements of the ‘necessity test’ (discussed
below)
• Processes to be used in making decisions e.g. pro-business regulatory
impact assessments (this may increase TRCC’s structural power)
• Required evidential basis for policy decisions to justify any measure
considered trade restrictive under international agreements
• Documentation, disclosure and reporting requirements for new regu-
lations/policy
• Obligatory engagement with TRCCs during policymaking processes
(this may also increase TRCC’s structural power)
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not a primary concern of tobacco control regulators globally, al-
though those considering plain packaging were concerned about the
risk of violating intellectual property laws and potential WTO litiga-
tion and had adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach to Australia’s WTO
plain packaging dispute (Côté, 2014). Another 2016 Canadian case
study reported that ministries had changed their decision-making to
account for trade concerns, including but not limited to investment
arbitration (Van Harten and Scott, 2016a). A 2017 Brazilian case
study found that most government stakeholders did not consider
trade agreements to pose a threat to tobacco control in Brazil
(Drope et al., 2017).
Structural power
With the majority of modern economies structured along neoliberal
lines to facilitate free market competition (Springer et al., 2016;
Lencucha and Thow, 2019), political elites are dependent on private
sector profitability to achieve set goals of job creation and economic
growth (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). As such, institutional structures
and practices may be reoriented to include private actors and priori-
tize their interests in both national and international decision-
making spaces. Within these otherwise closed spaces, THCCs may
have significant power to control the policy agenda and shape the
rules. While it is challenging to quantify particularly the agenda-
setting power of corporations (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007), we did
find evidence of institutionalization of industry involvement in pol-
icy processes.
Within international public health regulatory and norm-setting
bodies, alcohol and food corporations are increasingly privileged
with high levels of participation (George, 2018). For example, at
Codex meetings where food standards are developed by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, national delegations increasingly consist
of industry representatives, leading to concern that the Codex
agenda and standards are heavily influenced by private industry
(George, 2018). High-income country negotiating position on the
UN’s Political Declaration on the Prevention of NCDs was heavily
influenced by the food and alcohol industries (Stuckler et al., 2011)
and WHO’s associated Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity
and Health (2004) openly commits the WHO to collaborate with
the private sector. Furthermore, the WHO Global Action Plan for
the Prevention and Control of NCDs encourages governments to
consult with industry on policies and build partnerships with indus-
try to strengthen implementation of NCD prevention measures
(George, 2018). Given that international health guidelines and
frameworks (such as those mentioned) heavily influence national
health policy agendas, by influencing at the international level,
THCCs also indirectly shape domestic health policy agendas and
policy choices.
There is also substantial evidence that neoliberal political values
are deeply embedded in trade institutional arrangements at both na-
tional and international levels (John, 1998; Rushton and Williams,
2012; Lencucha and Thow, 2019). As such, formal trade policy
structures and practices institutionalize the participation of private
actors in policymaking spaces. For example, consultation with pri-
vate industry in the development of trade proposals is required by
law in the USA (Zeigler, 2009). During the TPPA negotiations, 85%
of the US trade advisory committee members were private industry
and trade group representatives (McNeill et al., 2017a). Analysis of
tobacco industry documents indicates high levels of co-operation be-
tween the US government and industry in efforts to gain greater ac-
cess to foreign tobacco markets (Holden et al., 2010). The EC’s 14-
member advisory group of experts advising TTIP negotiators
included at least seven representatives from various industries, and
just one representative from a public health organization (McNeill
et al., 2017a). Such frequent liaisons allow close relationships to de-
velop between industry and government such that a revolving door
between government and industry is acceptable and an effective
strategy for industry to gain privileged access to closed decision-
making spaces.
Conversely, public health actors are not generally perceived as le-
gitimate actors within trade institutions and structures and are
therefore not invited into otherwise closed and opaque trade policy-
making spaces. Without meaningful participation, health actors es-
pecially from LMICs are very limited in their capacity to influence
domestic or international trade policy (Khan et al., 2015). For ex-
ample, a health representative sits on just two of the US’ 16 trade
policy advisory committees (Lee et al., 2009). An Australian case-
study found limited opportunity for civil society or academics to
consult on Australia’s overall trade policy or for parliament to con-
sider social impacts/include non-trade objectives in trade agreements
(Baker et al., 2019). In a 2018 study, health actors across levels
reported being excluded from trade negotiating processes and a lack
of consultation to evaluate potential areas of trade and health policy
incoherence (Battams and Townsend, 2018). There are some exam-
ples of civil society and health actors being invited into domestic
trade decision-making spaces through new institutional arrange-
ments, but this does not necessarily result in increased influence
(Crosbie et al., 2014). As a formal or ad hoc observer on a number
of relevant WTO committees, the WHO can contribute to discus-
sions but are not officially permitted to be involved in decision-
making (Lee et al., 2009). Furthermore, many LMIC governments
may have particularly limited financial, human and technical cap-
acity as well as bargaining power to participate effectively in inter-
national trade and relevant health standard-setting spaces (e.g.
WTO and Codex) restricting their ability to protect national public
health interests (Walls et al., 2015).
The second element of structural power refers to rule-setting
power (Fuchs and Lederer, 2007). We identified some evidence that
as THCCs seek to grow sales in new markets and governments pri-
oritize export interests, THCCs are increasingly involved in domes-
tic health policy decisions. This reflects the view that industry is
legitimate collaborators and partners in national health policy
decision-making, as indicated by a number of qualitative studies pri-
marily conducted in LMICs (Bakke and Endal, 2010; Mialon et al.,
2016; Battams and Townsend, 2018; Oladepo et al., 2018; Thow
et al., 2018). Increased industry involvement appears to be linked
with the adoption of individual-level health policy instruments with
the least impact on industry profitability or alternatively, total pol-
icy inaction. A 2009 analysis of draft alcohol policy texts in Uganda,
Malawi, Lesotho and Botswana e.g. found that as a result of signifi-
cant industry input, alcohol policies in all four countries largely
reflected industry interests: focusing on the economic benefits of
trade in alcohol; taking an individualistic rather than whole-
population approach to alcohol harm reduction; emphasizing active
participation of alcohol industry in policy formulation and imple-
mentation and self-regulation of alcohol marketing (Casswell and
Thamarangsi, 2009). In Malawi, the tobacco industry specifically
plays a leading role on the National Working Group on Trade
Policy and the Private-Public Dialogue Forum and Malawi remains
one of the few countries yet to ratify the FCTC (WHO, 2014).
Given their perceived economic contribution and the increasing
complexity of trade agreements, governments also widely perceive
industry as key partners in developing domestic trade policy. For ex-
ample, policy and legal documents in both the USA and EU describe
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business as key partners in shaping national trade negotiation objec-
tives to prevent trade policies that are unfeasible or negatively im-
pact important industries (Jarman, 2017). This suggests THCCs,
including tobacco companies, may have significant influence over
trade rules. We identified some evidence to support this. For ex-
ample, Phillip Morris International’s (PMI) request for ‘harmoniza-
tion of legitimate, science-based regulations’, an investor-state
dispute mechanism, and a comprehensive ‘Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-plus’ chapter within the TPPA
(Fooks and Gilmore, 2014) were all included in the US draft of the
agreement (Fooks and Gilmore, 2014).
Discursive power
The neoliberal ideology that open and free competitive markets in
all areas of life will achieve economic growth and shared prosperity
(Lencucha and Thow, 2019) is central to contemporary global and
domestic policymaking processes across sectors and has deeply influ-
enced the way trade and health policy actors think and behave
(Rushton and Williams, 2012; Battams and Townsend, 2018). This
has included the individualization of disease aetiology, whereby ex-
posure to a limited number of behaviourally defined risk factors is
considered personal responsibility, not determined by complex
structural and social forces (Glasgow and Schrecker, 2015). Assisted
by their perceived legitimacy and high-level access to decision-
making spaces, THCCs have effectively propagated neoliberal fram-
ings that have helped entrench these restricted ways of interpreting
NCD cause and prevention. Consequently, policy space for address-
ing NCDs has largely been limited to measures that address individ-
ual choice (Navarro, 2007; Rushton and Williams, 2012) but do not
interfere with the ‘free’ market to trade goods and services within or
across borders. Feedback between institutions and dominant neo-
liberal ideas, values and frames has entrenched ‘trade over health’
policymaking norms over time. As such, norm compliance is not dic-
tated by interests alone but the function of the dynamics of discur-
sive power.
There is evidence that neoliberal ideas have shaped the interpret-
ation of issues at the intersection of trade and health. At the inter-
national level, the dominant perception amongst WTO officials
included in one study was that international trade is essential for
improving global public health without need for consideration of
the possible harms (Gopinathan et al., 2018). Similar perceptions
were identified in studies of domestic nutrition policy with trade
officials understanding NCDs as problems of ‘individual responsibil-
ity’ and demand for risk commodities an issue of choice, not a prob-
lem of supply facilitated by trade liberalization (Battams and
Townsend, 2018; Thow et al., 2018; Baker et al., 2019). In South
Africa, dominant policy actors believed economic growth, achieved
in part through international trade and investment, would resolve
nutrition problems causing NCDs by increasing consumer wealth
(Thow et al., 2018). Some LMIC governments also continue to per-
ceive tobacco exports as important for economic growth (Makoka
et al., 2017; WHO, 2014). In Malawi, one study found both health
and non-health sector actors perceived tobacco as important for eco-
nomic stability, job creation and to support health system and ser-
vice strengthening (Lencucha et al., 2018).
Within this context, where the dominant understanding of NCD
causation is congruent with neoliberal assumptions, relatively lim-
ited psychological boundaries around NCD prevention interventions
have been established. Notably, despite frequent recognition of the
upstream determinants of NCDs by relatively authoritative political
and scientific institutions, policy decisions still tend to ‘drift’ down-
stream to those safely within these narrow boundaries (Glasgow and
Schrecker, 2015). Specifically, in relation to risk commodities, con-
ceivable options tend to consist largely of demand-side interventions
while policies that address system and supply-side issues generally
fall outside of policy actors’ ideational boundaries. For example, in
both Australia and South Africa nutrition has generally not been
considered as a trade policy issue (Battams and Townsend, 2018;
Thow et al., 2018; Baker et al., 2019) and global NCD policy rec-
ommendations are broadly limited to individualized policy solutions
(Glasgow and Schrecker, 2015).
As a result of these described processes, policymaking norms
have emerged characterized by a persistent tendency for economic
and trade objectives to be prioritized over health resulting in volun-
tary public health policy inaction. At the supranational level, the
WHO’s 2004 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health
states that no provision within it should be considered justification
for trade-restrictive measures, and important trade issues were left
out of the 2011 Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control
of NCDs (UNPDNCD) after opposition by the USA and the EU
(Orbinski et al., 2011). The FCTC process also reflected the domin-
ance of trade interests in policy decisions. Despite efforts by a num-
ber of countries to ensure the FCTC emphasized the priority of
public health over international trade and investment objectives, the
FCTC remains subordinate to WTO (Mamudu et al., 2011;
Gruszczynski, 2015, 2017b).
At the domestic level, policy actors in Australia and Malaysia
identified that export interests were often privileged over health
objectives (Battams and Townsend, 2018). A study in Kenya,
Zambia and Malawi found that even health actors deferred to the
‘dominant economic development norm’ that tobacco is an econom-
ic commodity to be promoted (Lencucha et al., 2018), The Fijian
Ministry of Health opted for a voluntary over mandatory front-of-
package food labelling scheme due to concerns that mandatory
labelling would negatively affect trade (Mialon et al., 2016). Tonga
is reported to not have proceeded with a proposed restriction on a
fatty meat cut, concerned it would interfere with Tonga’s accession
to the WTO (Thow et al., 2010). Canadian policymakers involved
in health and safety regulatory development were reported to intern-
alize trade norms through ‘regulatory impact assessments’ which in-
clude consideration of trade implications for any new regulation,
and efforts by policymakers to avoid obstructing the free flow of
commercial goods/investment during policy design (Côté, 2014).
THCC’s perceived contribution to the economic growth objective is
widely argued to prevent governments from regulating risk com-
modities in an effort to contain industry costs (Mialon et al., 2016;
Battams and Townsend, 2018; Hawkins et al., 2018; Thow et al.,
2018; Baker et al., 2019).
The dogma that exporting risk commodity industries are essen-
tial for economic growth and job creation can also compel govern-
ments to pursue the interests of THCCs in trade agreement
negotiations and at WTO (Curran and Eckhardt, 2017; Barlow
et al., 2018). The USA has threatened trade sanctions against at least
five Asian countries if they did not open their markets to foreign to-
bacco products (Charoenca et al., 2012; Mackenzie and Collin,
2012) and nearly all trade and investment agreements negotiated by
the USA eliminate or reduce their trading partners’ tobacco tariffs
(Labonte et al., 2011). In 2014, when Jamaica and Ireland were
developing tobacco control legislation, the USA claimed the meas-
ures would contravene intellectual property obligations under
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international trade and investment agreements (Gilmore et al.,
2015). As recently as 2018, the EU, USA and UK supported tobacco
companies to oppose cigarette ingredients disclosure in Thailand at
the WTO (Charoenca et al., 2012).
As their legitimacy declines in HICs, tobacco companies have
turned to more economically vulnerable LMICs to act on their be-
half. LMICs have been encouraged to use WTO forums to make an
economic development argument against tobacco control by raising
Article 12.3 of the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement
that requires the special needs of developing countries to be taken
into account. This was used to oppose Canada’s ban on tobacco
additives to help mitigate youth smoking, the European Union
Tobacco Products Directive (EUTPD), Brazil’s additives ban and
Australia’s plain packaging regulation (Lencucha et al., 2016;
Gruszczynski). Five LMICs were supported by the tobacco industry
to mount the 2014 WTO challenge against Australia’s plain packag-
ing (Curran and Eckhardt, 2017). The tobacco industry also sup-
ported Malawi to raise a trade concern at the TBT committee
meeting over Canada’s Cracking Down on Tobacco Marketing
Aimed at Youth Act and Brazil’s ban on flavoured cigarettes
(Lencucha et al., 2018). At the supranational level, a number of
member states strongly opposed including a recommendation to ban
slim cigarettes in the FCTC policy guidelines based on an economic
rationale (Gruszczynski, 2017a).
The same trade and economic rationale have compelled govern-
ments to pursue the interests of the processed food and alcohol
industries within WTO forums. Concerns have been raised at
WTO’s TBT Committee in the interest of the processed food indus-
try including over Peru, Chile and Thailand’s proposed food label-
ling regulations (Thow et al., 2017a; Barlow et al., 2018). After the
EU and USA complained that Colombia’s mandatory alcohol health
warning labelling regulation was overly burdensome and costly to
trade, Colombia reduced the range of alcohols covered by the policy
and made regulatory compliance voluntary (Barlow et al., 2018).
THCCs encourage the trade over health policy norm by using
issue framing that resonates with accepted neoliberal logic, goals
and values. Industry has widely used generic economic arguments
that THCCs are vital for revenue and job creation (Gilmore et al.,
2015). THCCs have also applied specifically trade-focused econom-
ic framing to argue against progressive tobacco policy including in
New Zealand (Kelsey, 2017), Australia and the UK (Crosbie et al.,
2018; Mackenzie et al., 2018). The food industry in Fiji has persist-
ently argued that additional health-protective food policies would
have a significant negative trade/economic impact and make Fiji un-
competitive internationally (Mialon et al., 2016).
THCCs also use trade rules to shift public and political dis-
course, from health to a legal/technical focus (Curran and Eckhardt,
2017). The tobacco industry widely claimed that Australia’s tobacco
plain packaging legislation was in violation of international intellec-
tual property rules despite consistent legal advice to the contrary
(Freeman et al., 2008; Crosbie and Glantz, 2014). This suggests the
tactic was intended to create an alternative discursive reality
(Crosbie and Glantz, 2014; Ulucanlar et al., 2016; Mackenzie et al.,
2018) with the purpose of chilling regulatory progress and not ne-
cessarily to pursue and win a legal case. Lastly, tobacco companies
have also capitalized on neoliberal values claiming that tobacco con-
trol is government overreach and threatens individual freedom of
choice including in Australia, the UK and Canada (Baker et al.,
2017; Mackenzie et al., 2018). Along similar lines, the alcohol in-
dustry has widely and persistently propagated an individual-level
framing of alcohol-related harm (Mccambridge et al., 2018).
Discussion
This review identifies evidence of THCCs exercising and likely bene-
fiting from each of the three key forms of power outlined in our con-
ceptual framework expressed via various mechanisms. This power
resides at both the national and international level and in spaces
often closed to health and civil society actors but into which THCCs
have been invited. The often hidden and invisible nature of power
and non-decisions makes empirical analyses and drawing causal in-
ference between processes of power and outcomes inherently very
challenging. However, our findings do indicate linkages between
power exercised by THCCs and public health ‘non-decisions’. The
framework also provides initial insights into how proposed strat-
egies for change might effectively challenge existing power relations.
Firstly, evidence indicates THCCs exercise instrumental power
through their relationships (direct lobbying of trade policymakers)
and rules (threats of trade rule violations or operating through gov-
ernments to access legal mechanisms). Challenging industry’s instru-
mental power over trade policy might include bans on both THCC
political funding and lobbying itself as well as closing the revolving
door between government and industry. However, such strategies
remain largely unexplored in the trade and health literature.
Strengthening countervailing public health lobbying will be chal-
lenging given existing money and resource imbalances.
Post-treaty implementation measures to defend health policy
space and minimize the impact of trade-related arguments, legal
threats and challenges include strengthening public health coalitions
(Drope and Lencucha, 2014). For example, developing a multi-
sectoral coalition and long-term relationship-building with trade
officials meant Australian health actors were trusted to provide
sound legal advice to government about the legality of standardized
packaging (Crosbie et al., 2018). To counter industry legal threats
broad international issue networks advocating for Canada and
Brazil’s tobacco additives bans were also established (Drope and
Lencucha, 2014).
Other strategies to increase government confidence and ability to
design policies that are consistent with trade rules include capacity
building within national health departments on trade issues through
technical training and cross-departmental collaboration (Thow
et al., 2010; Drope and Lencucha, 2013; 2014). Close co-ordination
between health and trade officials was observed in both Canada and
Brazil when developing their tobacco additives bans to ensure com-
pliance with trade law and pre-empt opposition (Drope and
Lencucha, 2014). Neither case proceeded to a WTO dispute.
Similarly, in Australia close co-ordination between health and trade
officials was essential both in building cross-sectoral support for
standardized packaging and for developing a sound legal argument
to defend against industry threats and in the eventual WTO (and in-
vestment) litigation (Drope and Lencucha, 2014; Crosbie et al.,
2018).
In relation to international trade rules themselves, some experts
have recently argued that the relevant WTO Agreements do in fact
give governments significant space to design and implement, par-
ticularly tobacco control measures, but possibly also alcohol and
food regulation, provided they are supported by evidence and are
non-discriminatory (Drope and Lencucha, 2013; Voon, 2013;
Drope and Lencucha, 2014; Thow et al., 2017a). While supporting
evidence is primarily drawn from tobacco control-related WTO case
law, there may also be some relevance of these arguments for care-
fully crafted food and alcohol regulations. Analyses of TBT
Committee meeting minutes covering trade concerns raised over
labelling regulations of processed foods and alcohol health warning
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labelling tentatively support this (Thow et al., 2017a; O’Brien and
Mitchell, 2018). In Table 3, we present a summary of key conditions
that, if met, may reduce the scope for THCCs or other governments
to use trade rules as a tool for preventing tobacco, alcohol and food
regulation.
It is important to note, however, that satisfying these conditions
may not protect novel measures, particularly those not supported by
an international convention or set of standards. They do not take
into account the politics of policymaking that very often demands
compromise resulting in regulations that may discriminate between
like products from different countries (von Tigerstrom, 2013). They
also may not protect supply-side measures which may be highly
trade restrictive by design, e.g. product bans. Furthermore, having
to satisfy these measures may be challenging for some developing
countries with limited legal/technical resources to design policy to
meet these conditions, the capacity to conduct their own research,
or present a comprehensive defence in trade fora. Finally, more re-
cently negotiated regional trade and investment agreements, like the
TPPA and TTIP may establish higher bars for meeting some of these
conditions, in particular higher evidential requirements (Kelsey,
2013).
Secondly, neoliberal-oriented institutional structures, practices
and goals mean THCCs are often granted privileged access to trade
and health decision-making spaces where their interests limit the
scope of the agenda. Mobilizing broad coalitions to claim greater
access to trade policy decision-making spaces and increase the
visibility and legitimacy of health interests on the agenda will be
important to challenge structural power. For example, in Australia,
a broad network of tobacco control advocates managed to gain
legitimacy within trade policy spaces while the absence of such a
network mobilized on unhealthy diets and nutrition was an impedi-
ment to generating attention to this issue in Australian trade policy
(Baker et al., 2019). A strong domestic issue network developed in
support of Thailand’s graphic warning label regulation for tobacco
products was pursued despite subsequent industry legal threats
(Drope and Chavez, 2015).
Limiting industry representation on government trade commit-
tees as well as strengthening government institutional capacity for
healthy trade policy will also be important to challenge THCC
structural power. At the national level, Thailand is often cited as an
example of how sustained investment in technical capacity building
and inter-departmental co-ordination between trade and health
agencies can generate a common understanding of key health and
trade policy issues and bring health actors and considerations into
trade policy negotiating forums (Thaiprayoon and Smith, 2015;
Thow et al., 2017b). Importantly, however, it is uncertain whether
these strategies significantly changed Thailand’s trade negotiating
position highlighting the importance of exposing and challenging
power in all its forms. These strategies may have contributed to the
health agency’s confidence to pursue tobacco control regulation
including a graphic health warning labelling system, despite trade-
related threats from industry (Drope and Chavez, 2015).
Strengthened global institutional capacity will also be important to
strengthen attention to health interests in international trade policy
including through stronger WHO leadership and engagement on
health issues at the WTO; and providing technical assistance to gov-
ernments to more effectively assert health goals in trade policy at the
national level (Smith et al., 2009; Baker et al., 2015).
Addressing industry structural power in relation to domestic
health policy and international health standards, norms and laws
will require structures and rules governing interactions between
THCCs and both governments and international public health
standard-setting bodies (George, 2018). For example, the FCTC le-
gally obligates parties under Article 5.3 to adopt measures that pro-
tect ‘their public health policies related to tobacco control from
commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry’
(WHO, 2008). However, there has been selective and incomplete
implementation of recommended measures allowing significant on-
going opportunities for industry policy influence, again indicating
other forms of power are at play (Fooks et al., 2017).
Third, our findings suggest THCCs attempt to exercise agency
over discursive power through reinforcing various framings of
health issues in ways that resonate with neoliberal logic and values.
While it is impossible to draw causal inference, there was evidence
that decision-makers’ individualized interpretation of health issues,
the boundaries around acceptable solutions and resulting dominant
policy norms of ‘trade over health’ aligned with industry framings.
Counteracting these processes include amplifying and propagat-
ing alternative framings of trade and health issues. For example, in
Australia, tobacco control advocates focused on framing standar-
dized packaging around the direct harms of tobacco and Australia’s
commitment to the FCTC and exposing the manipulative nature of
the industry’s previous legal attacks (Crosbie et al., 2018). They also
successfully built understanding amongst trade actors of
Table 3 Conditions that may reduce restrictions on tobacco, alcohol and nutrition policy space created by international trade rules
1. Use by public health advocates of language familiar to trade practitioners (Drope and Lencucha, 2014)
2. Clear attempt to integrate health and trade objectives rather than reject principles of free trade outright (Drope and Lencucha, 2014)
3. Strong invocation of parties’ legal commitments to international health agreements (e.g. FCTC) or compliance with international standards
(Stumberg, 2013; von Tigerstrom, 2013; Drope and Lencucha, 2014; Russell et al., 2014)
4. Sufficient evidence to support the legitimacy, effectiveness and necessity of the measure to achieve a specific health outcome. It may be acceptable
that evidence is in the form of quantitative projections or qualitative reasoning (Stumberg, 2013)
5. Consistent reiteration of the importance of the health objective (Drope and Lencucha, 2013; Drope and Lencucha, 2014)
6. Emphasis the policy is a necessary part of a mutually supportive comprehensive set of measures, meaning that adopting one measure is not an alter-
native to other complementary measures (Thow et al., 2017; World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and
McCabe Centre for Law and Cancer, 2019)
7. Policies are designed to be as least trade restrictive as necessary without compromising elements essential to the measures effectiveness (Thow et al.,
2017)
8. Policies are designed so as not to discriminate between similar imported and domestic products with clear argument for why the products have
different end uses and physical characteristics. For example, a challenge that a labelling requirement for only certain types of calorie dense, low
nutrition snack is discriminatory against certain imported foods, could be argued against by outlining these snack foods are not like products under
the TBT to nutritious foods consumed at mealtimes (von Tigerstrom, 2013).






/heapol/advance-article/doi/10.1093/heapol/czaa148/6024433 by guest on 01 February 2021
standardized packaging not as a trade barrier, but as contributing to
economic prosperity, health and well-being (Crosbie et al., 2018).
Due to issue complexity, engaging the public and political leaders on
trade and nutrition or alcohol issues will, however, be more chal-
lenging. Health advocates will likely need to develop simple frames
that emphasise the direct and immediate impacts of trade agree-
ments on nutrition (Baker et al., 2019) or alcohol-related harm. This
will be important to encourage the understanding of NCDs and risk
commodity consumption as system-level problems helping to ex-
pand the range of acceptable policy solutions.
International health instruments including standards, guidelines
and particularly legally binding agreements can also contribute to
shifting policy norms and increase governments’ confidence in
adopting health measures despite trade-related concerns or legal
threats (von Tigerstrom, 2013; Barlow et al., 2018). Given they pro-
vide evidence of effectiveness and to some extent indicate necessity,
international health instruments can also support the assertion of
health objectives more strongly in WTO fora (Lester, 2015;
Gruszczynski, 2017b). Brazilian health policy actors have reported
confidence in their right to regulate tobacco in a manner consistent
with the FCTC (Drope et al., 2017) and relied heavily on the FCTC
in its defence of a ban on cigarette flavouring and additives (Drope
and Lencucha, 2014). Australia also drew on the FCTC in its WTO
defence over plain packaging (Drope and Lencucha, 2014; Crosbie
et al., 2018).
While through their discursive power, THCCs can foster and
reinforce neoliberal framings and norms, our findings suggest the
pervasive individualistic interpretation of NCDs, limited scope of
solutions and ‘trade over health’ policy norms cannot be explained
by TRCC agency alone. Rather, our findings tend to support the
‘structuration perspective’ that discursive power is also generated
from socio-political systems (Giddens, 1984; Fuchs and Lederer,
2007) and the system theorists’ view that system structures and
goals are strongly, although variably, determined by a dominant
neoliberal paradigm (Meadows, 2008). Furthermore, there is a
duality to the neoliberal system in that while policy actors can shape
it they are also enabled and constrained by it (Giddens, 1984),
including in relation to exercising or challenging discursive power
but also, we suggest, other forms of power too.
We argue therefore that adopting the strategies to challenge
THCC power described so far, as well as their ultimate effectiveness,
will likely be limited under the constraints of an overarching
neoliberal paradigm and system. As such, our analysis indicates that
sustainably transforming existing power relations that drive health
policy non-decisions will also likely require the development and
adoption of a new paradigm with public interest and sustainability
values and goals, supporting similar recent calls from public health
academics (Schram and Goldman, 2020). While hugely ambitious,
the COVID-19 pandemic and broader climate crisis may offer a rare
window of opportunity for public health actors to work with social,
environmental, and new economics advocates and build support
for such an alternative political and economic paradigm. The basis of
such models already exist in indigenous communities and at grassroots
level in the GlobalSouth and these alternative knowledge and value
systems should be centred in the development of an alternative ap-
proach (Droz, 2019; Jones, 2019). In Europe. Raworth’s Doughnut
Economics model that replaces the primary goal of economic growth
with an equity-focused goal of meeting the needs of all within the
means of the planet has gained significant interest (Raworth, 2017).
This analysis tentatively supports the potential utility of the con-
ceptual framework developed in this work for power analysis in
public health policymaking. The analysis indicates that a possible
revision of the conceptual framework to emphasize the broad influ-
ence of paradigms at the system level on processes of power may be
useful (Figure 3).
Limitations
This review has a number of key limitations. Given the multi-
disciplinary nature of the review topic as well as our restricted capacity
to undertake multiple secondary iterative literature searches in keeping
with the realist approach, it is possible that relevant explanatory mech-
anisms and data that supported or challenged them, was not captured
in this review. Also, identification of explanatory mechanisms may
have been limited due to the very few studies identified on trade and
health policy that explicitly engaged with theories of power.
Conclusions
Exposing all forms of power and their associated mechanisms is es-
sential for identifying and evaluating strategies that can generate the
shifts in power required to achieve transformative governance and
policy change in health, trade and other sectors for tackling NCDs.
However, theoretical and empirical research examining power at
Figure 3 Conceptual framework for analysing power in public health policymaking (revised).
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the nexus of trade and health policymaking, and in health policy
analysis more broadly, is currently very limited. More rigorously
incorporating theories of power in health policy analyses would be
useful for understanding how to push beyond the individualistic in-
terpretation of NCD risk and outcomes and expand ideational
boundaries to include strategies that address health-harmful product
supply but also the social and economic conditions within which
consuming these commodities occurs.
The findings of this review raise a range of other important re-
search questions including e.g. how do power relations and dynam-
ics between trade and health actors (and their associated outcomes)
compare in different contexts e.g. by varying levels of economic de-
velopment or socio-economic inequality, or under different (and dif-
ferent combinations of) predominant political and economic
paradigms? We hope the framework developed in this work is a
helpful starting point for shaping a research agenda that covers these
and other key questions, as well as providing a useful tool for future
analyses of power in health policymaking.
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